تسُد: الخطة الأمريكية الُمعدة
إن الإستراتيجية الأمريكية
الجديدة لمواجهة التمرد عبر
تقسيم المدينة إلى مناطق مغلقة
قد أثبتت فشلها في فيتنام. فأي
فرصة لها في العراق.
Fisk: Divide and rule - America's plan for Baghdad
a new counter-insurgency strategy to carve up the city
into sealed areas. The tactic failed in
with an ever-more ruthless insurgency in Baghdad -
despite President George Bush's "surge" in
troops - US forces in the city are now planning a
massive and highly controversial counter-insurgency
operation that will seal off vast areas of the city,
enclosing whole neighbourhoods with barricades and
allowing only Iraqis with newly issued ID cards to
campaign of "gated communities" - whose
genesis was in the Vietnam War - will involve up to 30
of the city's 89 official districts and will be the most
ambitious counter-insurgency programme yet mounted by
the US in Iraq.
system has been used - and has spectacularly failed - in
the past, and its inauguration in
the campaign has far wider military ambitions than the
latest "security" plan, of which The
Independent has learnt the details, was concocted by
General David Petraeus, the current
initial emphasis of the new American plan will be placed
far, the Baghdad campaign has involved only the creation
of a few US positions within several civilian areas of
the city but the new project will involve joint American
and Iraqi "support bases" in nine of the 30
districts to be "gated" off. From these bases
- in fortified buildings - US-Iraqi forces will
supposedly clear militias from civilian streets which
will then be walled off and the occupants issued with ID
cards. Only the occupants will be allowed into these
"gated communities" and there will be
continuous patrolling by US-Iraqi forces. There are
likely to be pass systems, "visitor"
registration and restrictions on movement outside the
"gated communities". Civilians may find
themselves inside a "controlled population"
theory, US forces can then concentrate on providing
physical reconstruction in what the military like to
call a "secure environment". But insurgents
are not foreigners, despite the presence of al-Qa'ida in
senior generals who constructed the new
"security" plan for Baghdad were largely
responsible for the seminal - but officially
"restricted" - field manual on
counter-insurgency produced by the Department of the
Army in December of last year, code-numbered FM 3-24.
While not specifically advocating the "gated
communities" campaign, one of its principles is the
unification of civilian and military activities, citing
"civil operations and revolutionary development
support teams" in South Vietnam, assistance to
Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq in 1991 and the
"provincial reconstruction teams" in
Afghanistan - a project widely condemned for linking
military co-operation and humanitarian aid.
3-24 is harsh in its analysis of what counter-insurgency
forces must do to eliminate violence in
the additional troops are in place the insurrectionists
will cut the lines of communication from
American reaction will be to use massive firepower,
which will destroy the neighbourhood that is being
ex-officer's fears for American helicopter crews were
re-emphasised yesterday when a military Apache was shot
down over central
American's son is an officer currently serving in
effort to create some order out of the chaos and the
willingness to take casualties to do so will leave some
residual respect for the Americans as they leave."
3-24: America's new masterplan for Iraq
3-24 comprises 220 pages of counter-insurgency planning,
combat training techniques and historical analysis. The
document was drawn up by Lt-Gen David Petraeus, the
In the eyes of some, a government that cannot protect
its people forfeits the right to rule. In [parts] of
Iraq and Afghanistan... militias established themselves
as extragovernmental arbiters of the populace's physical
security - in some cases, after first undermining that
In the al-Qa'ida narrative... Osama bin Laden depicts
himself as a man purified in the mountains of
As the Host Nation government increases its legitimacy,
the populace begins to assist it more actively.
Eventually, the people marginalise insurgents to the
point that [their] claim to legitimacy is destroyed.
However, victory is gained not when this is achieved,
but when the victory is permanently maintained by and
with the people's active support...
Any human rights abuses committed by
If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose
touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and
cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive
saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post
operations must be conducted, risk shared with the
populace and contact maintained.
FM 3-24 quotes Lawrence of Arabia as saying: "Do
not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the
Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It
is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it
FM 3-24 points to Napoleon's failure to control occupied
Do not try to crack the hardest nut first. Do not go
straight for the main insurgent stronghold. Instead,
start from secure areas and work gradually outwards...
Go with, not against, the grain of the local populace.
Be cautious about allowing soldiers and marines to
fraternise with local children. Homesick troops want to
drop their guard with kids. But insurgents are watching.
They notice any friendships between troops and children.
They may either harm the children as punishment or use
them as agents.
لهذه المقالات لا يعني أنها
تعبر عن وجهة نظر المركز كلياً
من حق الزائر الكريم أن ينقل وأن ينشر كل ما يعجبه من موقعنا . معزواً إلينا ، أو غير معزو .ـ