انعدام
الرؤية في غزة
التحرير
مجلة
ذا نايشن الأمريكية - 21/6/2007
لقد قيل في السنوات الأخيرة بأن
ظهور حماس جعل إسرائيل و أمريكا
تندمان على اليوم الذي فرطوا
فيه بعرفات.
دعونا نأمل بأن مزيداً من
المشاكل لن يجعلهم نادمين على
اليوم الذي فرطوا
فيه بحماس
Eyeless
in
Gaza
The
sharp escalation of the power struggle between Hamas and
Fatah, ending with Fatah's sudden collapse and the
seizure of power in
Gaza
by Hamas, is a tragic turn
of events for the Palestinian national movement--but
it's also bad news for
Israel
,
even though some Israeli strategists mistakenly thought
it was a good idea to foment civil strife. Although the
conflict was abetted by
Israel
and the
United States
,
neither should be happy with the results, which will
vastly complicate the already dismal chances for a
peaceful resolution of the wider conflict. The recent
events are a shocking demonstration of the failure of
Bush Administration policy in the region.
This
disaster has many fathers. The steady growth of the
Islamist movement cannot be understood apart from the
long-term US and Israeli strategy of undermining the
secular Palestinian leadership. In 1993 PLO leader Yasir
Arafat promised his people that the
Oslo
peace process would result in a Palestinian state.
Instead, Israeli settlements rapidly expanded during the
Oslo
period, even as the Israeli closure policy--which began
in 1993 and has never let up--shut off Palestinian
workers from the Israeli labor market and limited
freedom of movement inside the territories, resulting in
severe economic depression. Popular disillusionment with
the failures of
Oslo
helped bring about the
second intifada in the fall of 2000. During that
uprising, the Israeli government, blaming Arafat and the
Palestinian Authority for violence, did everything it
could to weaken the PA leadership. It continued that
policy when Mahmoud Abbas was elected president after
Arafat's death. Further undermining secular Palestinian
leadership was its corruption and misrule. The
gold-plated palaces of potentates like Muhammad Dahlan
were a standing insult to a
Gaza
population mired in
desperate poverty.
The
more direct cause of the
Gaza
mini-war lies in the Bush Administration's cynical
manipulation of "democracy promotion." This
scheme has its origins in the attempts, five years ago,
to push Arafat aside in favor of more pliable leaders,
hence the steady calls from the Administration for
"reform" and elections. The Israeli
government, with US approval, imprisoned Arafat in
Ramallah and then all but ignored Abbas, never pursuing
serious negotiations or releasing prisoners, even as it
continued construction of the separation wall and
expansion of settlements in the West Bank. This further
weakened Abbas and the secular leadership in the eyes of
Palestinians. Ariel Sharon's disengagement from
Gaza
was carried out without any consultation with Abbas's
government, which allowed Hamas to claim that Islamist
resistance had forced the pullout. When elections were
finally held early last year, Palestinians rejected the
discredited Fatah slate in favor of Hamas, whose victory
had far more to do with the Islamist movement's lack of
corruption and record as a provider of social
services--and its image of uncompromising resistance to
occupation--than popular support for its ideology.
Although
the polling was remarkably open and democratic, the
White House and the Israelis immediately set out to
undermine the Hamas government through economic boycott
and military subversion, funneling arms to Fatah
militias. (According to recently retired UN special
envoy Alvaro
de Soto
, the
US
special envoy said earlier
this year, "I like this violence," referring
to increased fighting between Hamas and Fatah, because
"it means that other Palestinians are resisting
Hamas.") Many observers were surprised at the quick
collapse of Fatah, assuming its superior numbers and
weaponry would be decisive, but no amount of arms or
numbers of men in uniform can make up for discredited
leadership and lack of motivation among the rank and
file. The plain fact is that more and more Palestinians
have begun to see the clique around Abbas and Dahlan as
sellouts, all too eager to accommodate US and Israeli
wishes. But the bloodshed has infuriated the population,
and many are now disgusted with both Fatah and Hamas.
What
to do? First, it's high time to cast aside illusions. We
cannot accept Hamas's ideology, and we reject the idea
that "Islam is the solution" to political
problems (the common formulation of Hamas and other
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated movements). But the
United States
and
Israel
must finally acknowledge that Hamas is a popular
movement with deep roots in Palestinian society, and for
that reason should be engaged rather than ignored. A key
function of diplomacy, after all, is to negotiate with
one's enemies; there would be little need for it if all
nations and political groups were on friendly terms. It
is commonly argued that negotiations are impossible
because Hamas will not recognize
Israel
and is bent on its destruction. But Hamas leaders have
repeatedly stated that they can live with a two-state
settlement, or at the very least a long-term hudna
(truce). Both Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya and his
political adviser, Ahmed Yousef, have made this point in
op-eds in the past month.
Yet
Washington
has quickly accepted
Abbas's constitutionally illegitimate formation of a new
emergency government. Further, it has promised to
release massive amounts of aid and is reportedly pushing
Israel
to dismantle checkpoints on the
West Bank
and release prisoners, in this way hoping to facilitate
a successful "Fatahland" on the
West Bank
that the Palestinians will compare favorably with a
quarantined and boycotted "Hamastan" in
Gaza
.
Israel
should certainly ease pressure on Palestinians and turn
over tax revenue owed them, and foreign aid is
desperately needed. But any scheme to promote a more
permanent division between the
West
Bank
and
Gaza
,
or to perpetuate Hamas's diplomatic isolation, is bound
to increase tensions. And it can hardly bring about a
viable peace agreement; arbitrary exclusion of a major,
democratically elected Palestinian constituency in favor
of malleable figures with little popular backing is
doomed to fail.
A
more realistic policy, for
Israel
as well as the
United
States
, would start with the
assumption that only negotiations with a unified, more
or less representative Palestinian leadership can lead
to long-term resolution of the conflict. And there is a
framework for such a settlement: the Arab League peace
proposal, which offers full peace for full Israeli
withdrawal from the territories. The promise to ease
conditions in the
West Bank
should be matched with urgently needed aid to
Gaza
and an end to closure of
the commercial exits there. Dismantling checkpoints,
transferring tax revenues and releasing prisoners should
be accompanied not by attempting to sow divisions among
Palestinians but by encouraging a unified new
leadership. Without such a leadership, negotiations are
impossible. And with no hope for negotiations and an end
to occupation, the misery and rage in the territories
will only continue to fester. It has been said in recent
years that the rise of Hamas would make
Israel
and the
United States
rue the day they dismissed Arafat. Let's hope further
disintegration doesn't make them rue the day they
dismissed Hamas.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070709/editors
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