النصر
العابر في الصومال
A
Fleeting Victory in
Somalia
By
JONATHAN STEVENSON
Published:
January
8, 2007
جوناثان
ستيفينسون -
نيويورك تايمز
8/1/2007
SOMALIA
’S
internationally recognized government pulled off a
stunning military victory over its Islamist rivals,
taking control of the capital,
Mogadishu
,
and the key port city of
Kismayo
last week. This may appear to bode well for the
containment of Islamism on the Horn of Africa. But
unless
America
plays a constructive role in
Somalia
’s
next stage, the conflict could become a regional war and
a new field of jihad.
The
success of the Transitional Federal Government and its
current prevalence were made possible entirely through
the help of troops from neighboring
Ethiopia
,
many of them trained and equipped by the
United
States
. Nevertheless,
Ethiopia
cannot be expected to act as the government’s main
force indefinitely. Nor, eventually, will Somalis, who
are almost all Sunni Muslims, tolerate an open-ended
occupation by Ethiopians, who are predominantly
Christians.
Enforcing
peace in a politically atomized territory is remarkably
difficult, as was painfully demonstrated by the American
intervention in
Somalia
in the early 1990s. Turning a humanitarian mission into
a coercive state-building effort angered local militia
bosses, leading to the now-infamous “Black Hawk
Down” attack.
The
Ethiopians, being thoroughly familiar with the American
experience and the Somalis’ historical tendency to
resist external influence, are already talking about
pulling out within a few months.
What’s
more, the American invasion of
Iraq
illuminates some drawbacks to any extended Ethiopian
military presence in
Somalia
.
Al Qaeda’s leadership would inevitably cast such a
commitment as the non-Muslim occupation of a Muslim
land. This would draw foreign jihadists into the
conflict and lead to greater Islamic radicalization of
Somalis themselves.
Indeed,
Ethiopia
’s
intervention and the United Nations Security Council’s
authorization of a notional peacekeeping force have
already prompted the Islamic Courts Council to declare
jihad. Once bitten, twice shy, the
United
States
should be loath to
perpetuate this kind of blowback. Similar considerations
also argue against a peacekeeping force led by a major
power — even if one could be marshaled, which at
present looks unlikely.
The
upshot is that there is no military solution to the
quandary of
Somalia
.
Robust diplomacy, with an eye toward creating some sort
of power-sharing agreement between the transitional
government and the Islamic Courts Council, appears to be
the only hope. Given the recent struggles in
Darfur
,
Congo
and elsewhere, the idea of bringing Africans to the
negotiating table might cause Westerners to roll their
eyes. But there are a few hopeful signs that, in
Somalia
,
diplomacy has a chance.
For
one thing, the European Union has shown an interest in
becoming an honest broker among the main Somali
factions. And
Kenya
,
alarmed by the prospect of tens of thousands of Somali
refugees pouring across its northern border, may feel
compelled to resume its longstanding diplomatic role in
Somali conflict resolution.
Finally,
neither the transitional government nor the Islamic
courts are in a position to take over wholesale
governance of the country: the various clan leaders,
tribal elders and militia bosses around
Somalia
together control the pulse of power. In fact, it was the
decision by dozens of local clan elders to withdraw
their political and military backing that made it
impossible for the Islamic Courts Council to defend
Mogadishu
and Kismayo.
This
parlay underscored how central the elders are to
Somalia
’s
tenuous political equilibrium, especially those of the
four main clans — the Darod, Hawiye, Dir and
Digil-Mirifle — and their various sub-clans. These
leaders must be included in any peace negotiation, and
any deal with their backing would be hard for the
Islamists or the transitional government to walk away
from.
The
knottiest substantive issue would likely be deciding to
what extent Islamic sharia law would apply in
Somalia
.
Naturally, the Islamic courts have insisted on universal
religious law, while the secular transitional government
has refused to entertain it. But there is recent African
precedent for breaking the deadlock.
In
January 2005, persistent negotiations overseen by the
United
States
, European powers and
Kenya
produced a power-sharing compromise between southern
Sudanese Christians and
Sudan
’s
Arab Muslim government. The deal was that sharia would
apply in the northern part of the country and not in the
south, and that its applicability in the capital,
Khartoum
,
was to be decided by an elected assembly. While the
unrelated violence in
Sudan
’s
Darfur
region has overshadowed this deal, it was a major
breakthrough between two groups far more religiously
divided than the two Muslim Somali sides.
The
temptation in
Washington
will be to keep its distance and rely on
Ethiopia
,
the European Union and
Kenya
for as long as possible. This attitude is myopic.
Neither the American public nor the world believe that
the Bush administration’s predominantly military
approach to counterterrorism is working. Relying
primarily on Ethiopian troops to tamp down Somali
Islamism would represent a continuation of that flawed
model, and of the corresponding risk of fueling the
jihad.
The
United
States
’ full participation in a
diplomatic process in the Horn of Africa, on the other
hand, would constitute a relatively low-cost way of
signaling a new American approach to Islam and a
re-engagement in sub-Saharan
Africa
, which has largely been
left out of
Washington
’s
post-9/11 calculus. A result could be a small political
victory in the Muslim world that would deprive Osama bin
Laden and his followers of a new grievance rather than
supplying them with one.
Jonathan
Stevenson is a professor of strategic studies at the
United
States
Naval
War
College
.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/08/opinion/08stevenson.html
 
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