لماذا
على إيران أن تتخذ الخطوة
التالية (إنكليزي)
بقلم:
ريتشارد دالتون- سفير بريطانيا
في إيران 2002-2006
دايلي
تيليغراف - 7/2/2007
Why
Iran must make the next move
By Richard Dalton
Last
Updated:
12:01am GMT
07/02/2007
With the
US
in danger of failing in
Iraq
and
Israel
thwarted in
Lebanon
,
Iran
sensed a historic opportunity last summer to spread its influence, make
itself safer, roll back the
US
and promote Islamic solutions in the region. A blend of
bilateral dialogue, multilateral diplomacy, UN measures,
and military deployments, pursued vigorously this year,
is now needed to blunt Iranian militancy and move the
nuclear issue in the right direction without provoking a
further war.
Iran
is a danger because of what it does in
Iraq
and
Lebanon
and what it threatens to do, including wiping
Israel
off the map. The consequences of military action are so
serious, however, that governments have a responsibility
to ensure that the diplomatic options are pursued to the
end. That has not happened yet.
This is not to take the military option off the table — but to be more
precise about it. Military action should be used in
accordance with international law in self-defence or to
prevent a clear and imminent threat.
Such a threat has not crystallised yet. According to the International
Institute of Strategic Studies,
Iran
could make enough highly enriched uranium for one nuclear
bomb in two years — assuming that that is what it
intends to do clandestinely.
In the stalled negotiations, it is
Iran
's move now, and it is too soon to say whether they will
budge. Their leadership have seemingly boxed themselves
in by vowing not to retreat a single step, but they
could carry domestic opinion with them in a U-turn if
the alternative was worse. A climbdown could be eased
for them, through a face-saving solution for both sides,
as the Permanent Members of the Security Council and
Germany
tried in the talks led by Mr Solana last autumn. There are some signs of a
reassessment in
Iran
of the costs and benefits of its policy of confrontation. The opprobrium it
brought them internationally has dismayed many in
Iran
.
This is because it has become clear to them that the international community
has leverage and may use it further. If
Iran
does not re-suspend its enrichment activities as called
for by the UN, this pressure should increase, including
through measures by European governments and companies
over and above those required by Security Council
Resolution 1737.
It is still vital that
Iran
suspends enrichment work, in accordance with the UN decision, as a
precondition for negotiation: for two reasons. If
development and installation of dual-use equipment were
forging ahead, no one could have confidence that an
accommodation could be reached. The permanent five and
Germany
want to facilitate a weapons-proliferation-proof nuclear
power programme in
Iran
for the long-term future. That means not prejudging the outcome on
enrichment facilities in advance.
To strike a deal, the permanent five may need to be flexible on the exact
terms of the offer they made to
Iran
in May 2006. There should be more precise language on
security assurances to
Iran
and a serious initiative to create regional security cooperation.
US
policy evolved in 2006 in favour of negotiating with
Iran
if it should resuspend its enrichment activities. If a
multilateral negotiation to resolve the nuclear dispute
were to begin, there is more the
US
could and should do to promote more responsible behaviour
by
Iran
.
No two countries with such a past could reach a "grand bargain" in
one bound. A process should begin with a joint
commitment to explore a wide-ranging agenda over time in
order to reduce tensions. Getting the necessary
political cover for starting would require a public
statement of a shared aim to improve security in the
region, and of an intention to examine the issues that
divide the two countries. This could be reinforced by
preliminary quick wins: decisions to change an aspect of
policy significant to the other.
Iran
could agree to an information exchange on Al-Qa'eda, a shared enemy, and
the
US
could state that it does not have a hostile intention
towards the Iranian people. Decisively presented to
domestic audiences, this could protect each side from
its own doubters.
This will not happen before it has sunk into
Iran
that their situation at home and abroad is not as strong
as they maintain it is for domestic consumption. The
Europeans can help here by being firm. Still it is a
fact that
Iran
needs an accommodation with the
US
because there are things only the
US
can unlock, including UN and US sanctions.
Nor are bilateral US/Iran talks likely to get far before the
US
has reduced the harm caused to its interests by the
Lebanon
war,
Iraq
, the festering of the
Middle East
peace
process and the perception of disunity at home and
collapsed prestige abroad. This has started with the
decisions President Bush made in December. It means
showing that Hizbollah will not roll the Lebanese
government over; that Iranian agents in
Iraq
have reason to fear arrest; that a balance of power can
be maintained in the Gulf; that the flow of oil will be
safe.
It is wrong to dismiss the
US
moves so far to counter Iranian ambitions as bellicose.
US
critics fear escalation from minor events, and that
cannot be ruled out. But there is not enough evidence to
dispute
US
assertions that it is on a diplomatic path in its
dealings with
Iran
. The
US
gives every appearance of calibrating its response to
Iranian actions. This is good news both for the
hoped-for evolution of
US
policy towards a direct dialogue with
Iran
and for getting a clear message through to
Iran
that they will not push the
US
aside. There is no time to lose.
Sir Richard Dalton was
Ambassador to Iran 2002-2006
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml;jsessionid=04GAH51A14IBVQFIQMGCFF4AVCBQUIV0?
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