حاول بالكلام, و باستطاعتك استخدام العصا فيما بعد

(حول التعامل مع إيران)

بقلم: مالكوم ريفكند

هيرالد تريبيون - 6/3/2007

Try talk. You can use the stick later

Dealing with Iran

Malcolm Rifkind

Published: March 6, 2007

LONDON : There is an eerie similarity between the recent escalation of tension between the United States and Iran and that which preceded the invasion of Iraq . Not surprisingly, many are predicting that it will end in the same way, with an American attack.

They might be right. Indeed, if all else were to fail, the use of the military option against Iran would have a greater justification than it ever did against Iraq .

Iran is more powerful than it has ever been. Few doubt its nuclear weapons aspirations and its ability to realize them. It is already the leading power in the Gulf and, with nuclear weapons, could dominate the Muslim Middle East.

The Arab states of the region do not support military action against Iran but they are desperately worried about Iran 's aggressive foreign policy. As Sunni states they also are deeply suspicious of Iran 's exploitation of its Shiite links with Shiite militias, political parties and terrorist groups.

There have to be the gravest doubts about whether military action against Iran would, in fact, destroy, or even seriously degrade, Iran 's nuclear capability. Yet Washington might be tempted to use force in the belief that no other realistic options are available to them.

Before he comes to that conclusion, President George W. Bush should study the lessons of what his own administration has achieved in the case of Libya and, perhaps, in the case of North Korea.

Both countries have been part of the axis of evil. Libya has now come in from the cold. It is possible that a process might now have begun which will achieve the same for the regime in Pyongyang .

One should not forget how improbable a normalization of relations with Libya seemed three or four years ago. Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi was personally responsible for the Pan Am Lockerbie bombing which killed hundreds of Americans. Libya was supporting a motley band of terrorist organizations; it was among Israel 's bitterest foes; it was trying to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Quite rightly, the new deal required Qaddafi to repudiate WMD, to discontinue support for terrorism and to transform his foreign policy. There needed to be not just assurances but verifiable inspection and safeguards.

In return, Qaddafi was offered not just dialogue with the United States and various economic incentives. He was offered full normalization of relations with Washington and an end to economic sanctions.

The recent agreement with North Korea suggests that similar inducements may, in due course, be available to them.

The time has come for the United States to make a similar offer to Iran . Since 1979 the Americans and the Iranians have refused to speak to each other. There has been an assumption that nothing short of regime change in Iran would ever change that.

This judgment may be correct, but it is worth testing. Indeed, the Americans have nothing to lose.

First of all, such an offer might actually be accepted. Iran is not North Korea , revelling in its isolation. Iran is a sophisticated country, and even the current regime attach importance to its links with international institutions and the world economy.

If the United States was to offer normalization in exchange for an end to support for terrorism, there would be many in Iran who would respond.

Indeed, if the Americans were to accept that regime change must be for the Iranian people to choose, and not for Washington , Iranians such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani would be seriously tempted.

But assume that I am wrong. Then if the Iranians, having been made such a generous offer, were to reject it and throw it back in America 's face, the U.S. would still be in a much stronger position than it is today.

The extremism and malevolent intent of the Iranian regime would have been demonstrated for all the world to see. It would be clear that they were unwilling even to take yes for an answer.

Against that background, the Americans would have many more allies and far greater support in calling for the toughest economic sanctions. Western Europe , including France and Germany , would be far more supportive. The Russians and the Chinese would be under greater pressure not to use their vetoes at the United Nations.

And if sanctions failed, or could not even be imposed because of inadequate support, the military option would be no less available than it is today.

Politicians regularly intone that the military option must only be considered when all other options have failed. Statesmen mean it.

President Bush has shown in the case of Libya that he can be pragmatic when circumstances justify it. A similar change of direction is now needed with Iran .

The United States would have little to lose, and it might even work.

Sir Malcolm Rifkind is a former foreign minister and defense minister of Britain .

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/06/opinion/edrifkind.php?page=2

-----------------

نشرنا لهذه المقالات لا يعني أنها تعبر عن وجهة نظر المركز كلياً أو جزئياً

ـ

ـ

من حق الزائر الكريم أن ينقل وأن ينشر كل ما يعجبه من موقعنا . معزواً إلينا ، أو غير معزو .ـ